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Neither Free Nor Fair: The 1996
Bosnian Elections and the Failure of

the U.N. Election-Monitoring Mission
ABSTRACT

The internationalcommunity faced a dfficult challenge
after the Dayton PeaceAccords ended the civil war in Bosnia.
Free and fair elections became an essential component to
establishinga democraticgovernment in the war-tom country.
The United Nations and the Organizationfor Security and
Cooperationin Europe responded by carrying out Annex 3 of
the Peace Accords, which called for such elections. The
resultant election-monitoringmission in Bosnia, however, was
unsuccessful The elections were held under improper
conditions. Therefore, the Bosnian people lack condence in
the democratic process, which is necessary for long-term
democracy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Cold War, Yugoslavia has been a region
in turmoil. The break-up of the country in 1991 left the resulting
republics unstable. Nowhere was this more evident than in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The ensuing civil war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina reintroduced the world to a concept rarely seen since
Nazi Germany: ethnic cleansing.
After many failed attempts, the international community
succeeded in securing peace in Bosnia through the Dayton Peace
Accords.
Specifically, this treaty gave the United Nations
(hereinafter U.N.) an opportunity to take the first steps toward
democracy in Bosnia: free and fair elections.1 Due to the intense
hatred between the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia, this
was a difficult, but not impossible, task. Unfortunately for those
in Bosnia and around the world, the U.N. failed to take full
advantage of this opportunity. Through an unsuccessful electionmonitoring mission, the U.N. and the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (hereinafter OSCE) failed to instill in
the Bosnian people the confidence in the democratic process
which is essential to establishing a long-lasting democracy.
Part II of this Note outlines the history of Yugoslavia. Part III
discusses the activities of the U.N., the European Community
(hereinafter EC), and the United States and their attempts to
secure peace in Bosnia. Part IV reviews Annex 3 of the General
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
which provides for free and fair elections in Bosnia. Part V

1.
See generally David Stoelting, The Challenge of UN-Monitored Elections
in Independent Nations, 28 STAN. J. INTL L. 371, 375 (1992) (discussing U.N.

election-monitoring missions in other countries emerging from civil wars).
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explains the history and purposes of multinational electionmonitoring missions. Part VI addresses whether the U.N. and the
OSCE had the authority to intervene in the Bosnian conflict and
monitor its elections. Part VII examines the actual elections that
took place on September 14, 1996. Finally, Part VIII analyzes and
evaluates the elections to determine whether the electionmonitoring mission was successful and considers the impact of
the elections and the monitoring mission.
I. THE HISTORY OF YUGOSLAVIA
Yugoslavia was first created as a single nation after World
War One. 2 On December 1, 1918, Prince Regent Alexander
proclaimed the creation of the Yugoslav state.3 This first unified
Yugoslavia was named the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and
Slovenes. 4 Bosnia, while part of this unified Yugoslavia, had
actually become an independent state in 1878.5 Even after its
independence, however, Bosnia's religious and political factions

rendered it unstable, 6

2.

Christian J. Garris, Bosnia and the Limitationsof Internationa Law, 34

SANrA CLARA L.REV. 1039, 1041 (1992).
3.

ROBERT J. DONiA & JOHN V. A. FINE, JR., BOSNIA AND HERCEGOVINAz A

TRADmON BETRAYED 123 (1994); Garris, supra note 2, at 1046. This Yugoslavia
was considered the first successor to the State of Serbia. Garris, supranote 2, at
1046 n.61.
4.

ED VULuAMY, SEASONs INHELL: UNDERSTANDING BOsNA's WAR 35 (1994);

DONIA & FINE, supranote 3, at 123-24.
5.
Garris, supra note 2, at 1045. Bosnia had been ruled by Turkey for
almost five hundred years. H. C. Darby. Bosnia and Hercegovina, in A SHORT
HISTORY OF YUGOSLAVIA: FROM FARLY TIMES To 1966, at 58, 63-66 (Stephen Clissold

ed., 1968). After losing wars to Austria, however, Bosnia gained "independence."
Id. at 66. This status of independence is somewhat misleading. Control of Bosnia
was simply, in practice, transferred to Austria. Id. at 68-69. "Thus instead of
becoming autonomous, Bosnia continued to be the property of an empire, albeit a
different one." Garris, supranote 2, at 1045 n.53.
6.
DONIA & FINE, supra note 3, at 101-09. Bosnia consisted primarily of
Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. In 1910, Bosnia consisted of 44% Serbs, 32%
Muslims, and 23% Croats. Garris, supra note 2, at 1045.
The Bosnian Serbs had struggled for and achieved autonomy for Serbian
church and school communes throughout Bosnia. DONIA & FINE, supra note 3, at
101-02. This led to the creation of the Serbian National Organization (hereinafter
SNO). This party believed that Bosnia was Serbian land and that the Muslims
there were of Serbian nationality. In the Bosnian Parliament elections of 1910,
the SNO won all 31 Serbian allocated seats. Id. at 102. The SNO continued to
press the Serbian cause in Parliament and the media. The SNO became the
foundation for later Bosnian Serb nationalist parties. It. at 102-03.
The Bosnian Croat political movement originated among intellectuals. One
faction formed the secular Croatian National Union (hereinafter CNU) as the
counterpart to the SNO. Id. at 103. The CNU was founded on the belief that
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At the end of World War Two, Yugoslavia came under the
socialist leadership of Josip Broz Tlto. 7
Following the war,
confusion surrounded the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina in

Yugoslavia because it had no majority nationality or national
name. 8 Nonetheless, Tito established six republics, including
Bosnia and Herzegovina, with boundaries closely corresponding to
9
those of the former Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

Therefore, to an extent, the distinctiveness of Bosnia and
Herzegovina was preserved in the Yugoslav political system. 10
Tito continued to rule Yugoslavia, including the ethnically divided
Bosnia and Herzegovina, until his death in 1980.11
After Tito's death, the ethnic tensions began to swell and

destabilize the country. 12

Serbia, the dominant military and

Bosnia was Croatian land, and that the Muslims present were of Croatian
nationality. The other faction organized the Croatian Catholic Association
(hereinafter CCA), which emphasized clerical ideals and religious exclusivity. Ad
at 104. In the 1910 elections, the CNU won 12 seats, and the CCA won four
seats. Id.
The final group was the Bosnian Muslims. Traditionally, the Muslims have
been the "swing" group in Bosnian politics. Until 1992, the Serbs and the Croats
both wanted a coalition with the Muslims to forge a majority in government. In
1992, extremists took control of both the Serb and the Croat movements and
started the civil war to drive out the Muslims. Id. at 104. The Muslims also
obtained autonomy and formed the Muslim National Organization (hereinafter
MNO). Id. at 108. The MNO became the basis for future Muslim political
organizations.
nlustrating the tumultuous Bosnian political scene, the Serbs formed a
coalition in Parliament with the Muslims in 1910; however, after the Muslims
believed the Serbs started a peasant revolt against Muslim landowners, the
Muslims allied with the Croats in 1911 to form a new political majority Id. at
109.
7.
Garris, supra note 2,at 1041; DoNIA & FINE, supranote 3, at 159. Tito
was the leader of the partisans who achieved victory for Yugoslavia in WIL.
DONiA & FINE, supra note 3,at 149-54. This led to Yugoslav independence and
the creation of the socialist "Democratic Federative Yugoslavia." Id. at 159.
8.
VULUAMY,supra note 4, at 37; DONIA& FINE, supra note 3, at 161.
9.
VULUAMY, supra note 4, at 37-38: DONiA & FINE, supra note 3, at 161.
10.
DONIA & FINE, supra note 3, at 161. Tito ruled that a return to the
pre-royalist frontiers of a federated Bosnia was the appropriate outcome, and the
meeting which founded that republic in 1943 declared: The steadfast decision of
all nations and nationalities to live firmly united in brotherhood, unity and
freedom in the Federal Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.' Bosnia would be 'neither
Serbian, Croatian, [nor] Muslim, but Serbian, Croatian, and Muslim." VuLuiy,
supra note 4, at 37-38.
11.
Garris, supra note 2, at 1041. His reign, however, was not without
violence. This was especially true during his first years as leader when he
punished anti-partisan soldiers and civilians. "It has been estimated that up to
250,000 people were killed by Tito's mass shootings, forced death marches and
concentration camps in the period of 1945-[416." NOEL MALCOLM, BOsNIA: A SHORT
HiSTORY 193 (1994). This included many Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims.
'CL
12.
Garris, supra note 2, at 1041.
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political republic, fought to maintain the federal system of
government in Yugoslavia. 13 President Slobodan Milosevic led
this Serbian movement after he ascended to power in 1987.14
Ironically, Serbia's failure to recognize Croatia's right to the
rotating federal Presidency in 1991 played a key role in the
subsequent independence movements by some of the republics. 15
Slovenia and Croatia soon declared their independence, and

Macedonia became autonomous. 16 Again, Bosnia's future was
uncertain because of its lack of a clear ethnic majority. 17 At that
time, the population of Bosnia consisted of approximately fortyfour percent Muslims, thirty-three percent Serbs, nineteen
percent Croats, and four percent others. 18
The Bosnian Serbs wished to join their occupied regions of
Bosnia to Serbia. 19 Similarly, the Bosnian Croats wanted to join
their occupied regions to Croatia.20 Alternatively, the Bosnian
Serbs and Croats sought complete ethnic autonomy within
Bosnia. 2 1 The problem with this final alternative was that no
clear ethnic lines could be drawn in Bosnia because the three
22
ethnic groups were intermingled throughout the republic.
Soon after the conflict surrounding the federal presidency,
actions by Yugoslav and international bodies resulted in Bosnian
independence. On October 15, 1991, the Bosnian Assembly,
23
under President Alija Izetbegovic, declared its independence.
On December 15, 1991, the EC made an offer of recognition to
Bosnia.2 4 On January 3, 1992, the four republics remaining

13.
Id.
14.
DoNiA& FINE, supranote 3, at 184.
15.
Id. at 214. Pursuant to a prior agreement, the federal Presidency of
Yugoslavia was to be rotated annually among Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia,
Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Vojvodina, Kosovo, and Serbia. Serbia, led by

President Milosevic, controlled the votes of Montenegro, Vojvodina, and Kosovo.
With these four votes, Serbia declined to support the Croatian Stipe Mesic as
President. Thus, on May 15, 1991, Yugoslavia was without a president and
commander-in-chief. Mesic was subsequently confirmed in July 1991, at the
urging of the EC. Id. However, the damage to the federal system had already
been done.
16.
17.

Garris, supra note 2, at 1041.
EDGAR O'BALANCE, Crw WARIN BOSm,

18.
19.
20.

Id.
Garris, supra note 2, at 1041.
Id.

21.

Ild.

1992-94, 2 (1995).

This final alternative was based on the strong desire of the Bosnian

Serbs and Croats not to be ruled by the Muslim plurality. Such antagonism dates
back hundreds of years. Id. at 1041-42.

22.
Id. at 1042.
23.
O'BAuANcE, supra note 17, at 7. The Serbian Members of the
Assembly abstained from the vote and walked out. Id.
24.
Id. The EC announced full recognition of Croatia and Slovenia on
January 15, 1992. However, the EC withheld such recognition from Bosnia
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under control of the federal presidency declared themselves the
25
Third Republic of Yugoslavia.
On January 25, 1992, the Bosnian Assembly followed its
independence declaration with the approval of a formal
referendum on Bosnia's independence. 26 The referendum, held
February 29 through March 1, 1992, was boycotted by the
Bosnian Serbs. 2 7 Despite the boycott, sixty-three percent of
28
Bosnia's population voted in favor of independence.
On March 3, 1992, President Izetbegovic proclaimed the
independence of Bosnia.2 9 Formal recognition by the EC followed

on April 6, 1992. 30

The Bosnian Serbs responded to the

independence of Bosnia when Radovan Karadzic announced the
formation of The Serbian Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 3 ' After
this announcement, the Bosnian Serbs launched their offensive to
reclaim Bosnia and unite the Serbs.3 2 This resulted in one of the
bloodiest civil wars in recent times.

Ill. AcTvrnEs OF THE U.N., THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, AND THE
UNITED STATES IN YUGOSLAVIA AND BOsNIA
The peace process in Bosnia was slow and complicated; it
involved several different international bodies and a few interested
foreign countries. The five-year process consisted of various
unsuccessful agreements among new emerging entities in the
region such as the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These early negotiations
and agreements, while unsuccessful, provided the essential basis
for the Dayton Peace Accords. The region's ethnic diversity and
its bloody civil war left many important issues to be resolved. The
peace process provided a forum through which the emerging
entities could develop their own identities. Consequently, a slow

because it believed "the risks of ethnic conflict and constant instability were too
great for it to be considered a mature nation in full control of its internal affairs."
Id. at 7-8.
25.
Id. at 9. These republics were Serbia, Montenegro, Vojvodina, and
Kosovo. Id.
26.
Id. This vote was boycotted by the Serbian members of the Assembly,
IdL
27.

Id.

28.
Id. at 9-10. While between 65% and 66% of the population actually
voted. 99% of those votes were in favor of independence. Id. at 10; Garris, supra
note 2, at 1042 n.25.
29.
O'BALLANcE, supra note 17, at 11.
30.
MALCOLM, supranote 11, at 234.
31.
O'BALLACE, supranote 17, at 14.
32.
Garris, supranote 2, at 1042 n.25.
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peace process was necessary to build a consensus for the Dayton
Peace Accords.
A. EarlyAttempts at Peace

Before Bosnian independence, the EC organized the
Carrington Conference to discuss the conflict in Bosnia.3 3 The
original purpose of the conference was to discuss ways to keep
Yugoslavia, known as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(hereinafter SFRY), together as a state.3 4 The result of the
complex negotiations was a text prepared by Lord Peter
Carrington entitled Treaty Provisions for the Convention.3 5 After
President Milosevic of Serbia refused to accept it, this phase of the
conference ended, and the text of the treaty was abandoned. 36 In
37
the later stages of the conference, the Badinter Commission
3
released a series of advisory opinions pertaining to the conflicts. 8
Three of these opinions, recited below, applied to the emerging
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina:
1)
though the Bosnian Serbs had a right to selfdetermination, this did not imply the right to separate themselves
from the future state;
the internal boundaries of the Republics within the
2)
former SFRY had, on the dissolution of that state, become
international boundaries due to the respect such borders are
accorded under international law;, and
3)
the future Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, though

it had by December 1991 not yet formally decided on
independence, would be a state worthy of recognition by the EC

and its members once that decision had been taken. 3 9

33.
Paul C. Szasz, The Quest For a Bosnian Constitution: Legal Aspects of
ConstitutnalProposalsRelating to Bosnia, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 363, 364 (1995).
Szasz is the Legal Adviser to the International Conference on the Former
Yugoslavia. Id at 363 n.1. The Carrington Conference, also referred to as the
"EC Peace Conference on Yugoslavia," was established in September 1991 and
named for its chairman, Lord Peter Carrington. Id. at 364.
34.

Id.

35.
Id. An earlier version is printed in Report of the Secretary-General
Pursuantto Paragraph3 of the Security Council Resolution 713, U.N. SCOR, 46th
Sess., Annex VII, at 36, U.N. Doc. S/23169 (1991).
36.
Szasz, supra note 33, at 364-65. The leaders of five of the six
republics accepted the treaty. Id. at 364. Although the text was abandoned, the
human rights provisions became the basis for future constitutional proposals. Id.
at 365.
37.
This was the Arbitration Commission of the Carrington Conference. Id.
38.
Id
39.
Id. See Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission OpinionNo. 2,
31 I.L.M. 1497 (1992); Conference ori Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission Opinion
No. 3. 31 IL.M. 1499 (1992); Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission
Opinion No. 4 on International Recognition of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-
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Because the Carrington Conference failed to achieve its original
goal of keeping the SFRY together as a state, its purpose
fundamentaly changed. 4 0 First, it was to preside over an "orderly
dissolution" of the SFRY.4 1 Thereafter, it was to prevent the
disintegration of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina once it
obtained its independence. 42
As a result, the Conference
organized the Round of Talks on Bosnian Constitutional
Arrangements,
headed by Portuguese Ambassador Jose
CUtlleiro. 4 3
On March 18, 1992, just two weeks after Bosnia
declared its independence, the talks concluded with the
Statement of Principles for New Constitutional Arrangements for
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 4 4 This solution would divide Bosnia into
three autonomous and ethnically-defined areas, held together
under a weak central government. 45 The principles were quickly
denounced despite the informal agreement among the leaders of
46
the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims.
Following the failure of the Carrington Conference, 4 7 the
London International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia
(hereinafter ICFY) was jointly formed by the U.N. and the EC on
August 26 and 27, 1992. 4 8 The Statement on Bosnia that came
from the conference called for the "respect for the integrity of the
present frontiers" and the implementation of human rights
principles to stop the "ethnic cleansing" in the civil war.4 9 The
largest contribution of the conference was the establishment of

ICFY. 50

Hercegovina by the European Community and Its Member States, 31 LL.M. 1501
(1992).
40.
Szasz, supranote 33, at 365.
41.

Id.

42.
Id.
43.
Id.
44.
Id. The Statement, amended on March 31 to include additional
human rights principles, became known as the Cutileiro Principles. Id.
45.

Id. at 366.

46.

Id.

47.
One commentator stated that the Conference was ... too large, too
wide in scope and too unrealistic, and its delegates were too diverse in beliefs,
aims. and attitudes for any significant and positive statesmanlike decisions to
emerge. It was little more than a glorified photo opportunity, in which all present

basked briefly in international limelight, few gaining any stature." O'BALLANCE,

supranote 17, at 87.
48.
Szasz, supranote 33, at 366.
49.
Id. See InternationalConference on the Former Yugoslavta: Documents
Adopted at the London Conference, 31 I.L.M. 1527, 1531-48 (1992).

50.
Szasz, supranote 33, at 366. The ICFY was also known as the VanceOwen Negotiations and the Geneva Conference. Id.

19971
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After negotiations with the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims,
Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen 5 I were left to contemplate five
different solutions to the constitutional problem in Bosnia and
Herzegovina:
(1)
a centralized state, logical for a country of only 4.5
million people;
(2)
a federal state of seven to fourteen "provinces," each
with a marked ethnic character but also containing minorities from
the other groups;
(3)
three ethnically characterized "republics" loosely
confederated in a "union;"
(4)
three ethnically characterized independent states, with
only normal neighborly ties; and
(5)
absorption of the Serb areas of Bosnia into Serbia and
of the Croat areas into the Republic
of Croatia, leaving a Muslim
52
state as the remaining Bosnia.

After considering these options and further negotiating with the

three parties, in October 1992 Vance and Owen presented a
detailed proposed constitutional structure for Bosnia and
Herzegovinato the ICFY, the U.N., and the parties.5 3 They based
the proposal substantially on option (2) of creating a federal state
of seven to fourteen provinces.5 4 The three parties, however,
refused to discuss the proposal further because Vance and Owen
could not specify the number of provinces, their boundaries, or
the number of provinces to be allocated to each party.5 5
B. Te Vance-Owen Plan
On January 2, 1993, the ICFY met for negotiations with the
56
leaders of the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian Croats, and Serbia.

51.
Vance and Owen were the co-chairmen of the ICFY Steering
Committee. Id.
52.
Id. at 366-67. Option (1) was favored by the Muslims who, with 45% of
the population, had a solid plurality and could expect to obtain an absolute
majority because of their higher birthrate. For this reason, option (1) was
unacceptable to the Serbs and Croats, who favored option (4). Option (3)
essentially embodied the Cutileiro Principles. See supra notes 44-46 and
accompanying text. Vance and Owen considered options (4) and (5) beyond their
mandate, as they would not preserve the territorial integrity of Bosnia. They felt
(3) was unstable because it was merely a prelude to (4).
53.
Id. This was the precursor to the Vance-Owen Plan. See Report of the
Secretary-Generalon the InternationalConference on the Former Yugoslavia, U.N.
SCOR, 47th Sess., Annex VII, at 45, U.N. Doc. S/24795 (1992).
54.
Szasz, supranote 33, at 367.
55.
Id. at 367-68.
56.
Id. at 368. The Bosnian Serb leader was Radovan Karadzic. He was
supported by the Presidents of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia, and
Montenegro. The Bosnian Croat leader was Mate Boban. He was supported by
the President of Croatia Id.
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Vance and Owen submitted a peace plan consisting of four
57
proposals:
(1)
a draft "Agreement Relating to Bosnia and Herzegovina,"
the core of which consisted of ten (later reduced to nine by
combining two) briefly expressed Constitutional Principles, largely
derived from the earlier Constitutional Proposals;
(2)
a proposed map dividing the country into ten provinces,
three each with a predominantly, but not exclusively, Muslim,
58
Serb, or Croat ethnic character, plus a multi-ethnic SaraJevo;
(3)
a draft "Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina," largely developed by the military leaders of the three
parties meeting under the chairmanship of the U.N. Protection
Force (hereinafter UNPROFOR) Commander, specifying detailed
arrangements for the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of
forces under UNPROFOR supervision; and
(4)
a draft "Agreement on Interim Measures" to bridge the
gap between the ongoing warfare and the implementation of the
proposed decentralization of Bosnia under a Constitution
conforming to the Constitutional Principles. 5 9

This became6 0known as the Vance-Owen Plan (hereinafter VanceOwen Plan).
The Bosnian Croats quickly accepted all parts of the Vance-

Owen Plan because the proposed map was quite favorable to
them. 6 '

At the end of March 1993, the Muslims reluctantly

accepted all parts of the Vance-Owen Plan.6 2 After intense
pressure from Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(hereinafter FRY), the Bosnian Serbs accepted the Vance-Owen
Plan, subject to ratification by their Assembly. 6 3 The Bosnian

57.
Id. The original plan consisted of only three proposals. See Report of
the Secretary-Generalon the Activities of the InternationalConference on the Former
Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex V, at 16, Annex VI, at 20, Annex VII, at
36, U.N. Doe. S/25050 (1993). A fourth was added during the negotiations.
Szasz, supra note 33, at 368.
58.
The central government and the provinces, except Sarajevo, would
have separately elected legislatures and chief executives and independent
judiciaries. O'BALANCE, supra note 17, at 136. The central government would
have a nine-member presidency consisting of three members of each ethnic
group. The provinces would be responsible for the majority of governmental
functions, but they would have no international legal status and could not enter
into legal agreements with foreign states or international organizations. Id. See
also VULUAMY, supra note 4, at 250 (map of Bosnia under the Vance-Owen Plan);
O'BALLANCE, supra note 17, at 257 (map of Bosnia under the Vance-Owen Plan).
59.
Szasz, supra note 33, at 368. See Report of The Secretary-Generalon
the Activities of the InternationalConference on the Former Yugoslavia Peace Talks
on Bosnia and Herzegovina, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annexes I-IV, at 27-36, U.N.
Doc. S/25479 (1993).
60.
Szasz, supra note 33, at 368.
61.
Id. at 368-69.
62.
Id. at 369.
63.
Id.
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Serb Assembly swiftly rejected ratification. 6 4

The results of a
referendum demonstrated overwhelming agreement with this
65
decision.
While the Vance-Owen Plan failed to negotiate peace, it also
66
proved immensely harmful to the military conflict in Bosnia.
The proposed map gave the provinces ethnic labels, while at the
same time negotiations gave the impression the boundaries were
not final.6 7 This had the effect of renewing military competition
for the labeled territories, and became "the second most
important contribution of the West to the destruction of Bosnia:
it stimulated the development of a genuine Bosnian civil war, and
alliance which had
in so doing it broke down the Croat-Muslim
68
Serbs."
the
to
barrier
effective
been the only
After the Bosnian Serb rejection of the Vance-Owen Plan, the
ICFY69 encouraged the Bosnian Croats and Muslims to reach an
agreement similar to the Vance-Owen Plan to govem the
territories

they controlled. 70

The two

parties reached

an

agreement on draft instruments on certain subjects. 7 1 Although
the proposed agreement was quickly abandoned, draft
instruments on three issues became the basis of most later
constitutional proposals:
the role of ombudsmen;
the creation of a Human Rights Court; and
a list of international human rights instruments to be
any constitutional or legislative
incorporated into
2

(1)
(2)
(3)

arrangements.

7

64.

Id.

65.

Id. Many Serb leaders in the political and military ranks believed they

could get what they wanted without an agreement such as the Vance-Owen Plan.
MALCOLM,
66.
67.
68.

supra note 11, at 248.
MALCOLM, supra note 11, at 248.
Id.
Id

After the Bosnian Serb rejection, Cyrus Vance departed and was
69.
replaced by Thorvald Stoltenberg. Szasz, supra note 33, at 369. Stoltenberg was
the Foreign Minister of Norway and a U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. Id.

at n.10.
Id. at 369. The Bosnian Croats and Muslims still nominally
70.
participated in governing the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Id.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
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C. The Invincible Plan

The next attempt at peace was under the Invincible Plan
(hereinafter IP). 73
The thrust of the IP was a proposed
Constitutional Agreement, reflecting the Cutileiro Principles and
ICFY option (3).74
It called for three predominantly ethnic
provinces loosely governed by a weak union. 7 5
Although
accepting its principles, the Muslims quickly rejected the IP on
territorial grounds: it allocated only thirty percent of Bosnia to
the Muslims, compared to thirty-six percent under the Vance76
Owen Plan.
The new European Union (EU) later attempted to revive the
IP.
The EU persuaded the Bosnian Serbs, who held
approximately seventy percent of Bosnia, to allocate one-third of
Bosnia to the Muslims and 17.5% to the Croats. 7 7 There was no
consensus, however, as to how to alter the IP map.
Consequently, this attempt to revive the IP was abandoned in

January

1994.78

D. U.S. Intervention

After these attempts at peace failed, the United States
organized new negotiations between the Bosnian Muslims, 79 the

Bosnian Croats, and Croatia.8 0 On March 1, 1994, the parties
agreed to the Framework Agreement for the Federation and the
outline of a Preliminary Agreement on the Principles and
Foundations for the Establishment of a Confederation Between
the Republic of Croatia and the Federation. 8 '
Negotiations
continued, and on March 18, 1994, the parties agreed to the
Proposed Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina 8 2 and the Outline of a Preliminary Agreement

73.

Id. at 370. The Invincible Plan, negotiated on September 20, 1993,

was named after the British carrier HMS Invincible where the agreement was
finalized. Id.
74.
Id.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 371.
The Bosnian Muslims called themselves Bosniacs to emphasize their

alleged non-ethnic, non-religious character. Id.

80.
Id.
81.
Id. (quoting Letter Dated 3 March 1994 From the Permanent
Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia to the United Nations
Addressed to the Secretary-Genera, U.N. Secretary-General, Attachment II, at 13,
U.N. Doc. S/1994/255 (1994)).
82.
Bosnia and Herzegovina Proposed Constitution of the Federation, 33
I.L.M. 740 (1994).
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Concerning the Establishment of a Confederation Between the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of
Croatia.8 3 On March 30, 1994, the parties established the
Federation, despite the fact that the boundaries of the eight
"cantons" constituting the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
the parties
were not defined.8 4 Ultimately, on May 11, 1994,
85
reached an agreement on the cantonal boundaries.
The Federation Constitution divided the Federation's eight
cantons between two groups;8 6 four cantons were to be Muslim
(Bosniac), two were to be Croat, and two were to consist of a
mixture of Muslims and Croats. 8 7 Consequently, the Constitution
Plan and ICFY option (2), albeit between
restored the Vance-Owen
88
only two parties.
E. The Contact Group
The formation of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(hereinafter BH Federation) between the Muslims and Croats still
left the Serbs out of the peace process.8 9 As a result, in May
1994, the United States, Russia, France, Germany, and the
United Kingdom formed the Contact Group to work alongside the
After significant negotiations, the Contact Group
ICFY.9 0
presented the Bosnian Serbs and the BH Federation with a
proposed map of Bosnia based on a 51/49 division of the land in
favor of the BH Federation. 9 1 The Bosnian Serbs, however,
of the placement and quality of
rejected the proposal on the basis
92
Serbs.
the
to
the land allocated

Szasz, supra note 33, at 372. See Bosnia and Herzegovlna-Croatiw
83.
PrelimnaryAgreement Concerning the Establishment of a Confederation,33 I.L.M.

605 (1994). The Federation would have a strong central government on Sarajevo.
O'BALLANCE, supra note 17, at 241. The Muslims and Croats would each have a
certain number of self-administering cantons. More importantly, the Muslim and

Croat armies would be merged. Id.
84.

Szasz, supranote 33, at 372.

85.
86.

Id.
Id.

87.

Id.

88.
89.
any peace
90.

Id.
The Serbs occupied as much as 70% of Bosnia. Id. at 373. Therefore,
negotiations needed to include the Serbs.
Id. The parties agreed that the Contact Group could only act by

consensus. Id.

91.

Id. The ratio for division came from two prior Serb concessions to

allow one-third of Bosnia to the Muslims and 17.5% to the Bosnian Croats. Id. at

n. 18. This amounted to 50.8% of Bosnia. Id.
Id. at 373. The BH Federation had reluctantly accepted the map. Id.
92.
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Despite the failure of the territorial negotiations, the Contact
Group informally proposed a text for a Union Constitution. 93 The
constitution was an ICFY option (3) construct 94 limited to two
parties: the Muslim-Croat BH Federation 95 and the Bosnian Serb
Republika Srpska9 6 (hereinafter RS). 97 Because the Bosnian
Serbs did not accept the map agreements, however, no
comprehensive agreement on the constitutional principles could
be reached. 98
With the Contact Group stalled, the United States took the
lead in establishing further negotiations between the two principal
groups: (1) the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereinafter
BH Republic) and the BH Federation, and (2) the RS. 99 These
negotiations, led by Assistant U.S. Secretary of State Richard
Holbrook,

resulted

agreements.100

in

two

fragmented

constitutional

These agreements, between the BH Federation

and the RS, were similar to the Contact Group proposal, ICFY
option (3), with details to be finalized later. I0 1 This ultimately led
to the Dayton Peace Accords.

F. The Dayton PeaceAccords
Under the auspices of the Contact Group,' 0 2 the many

interested parties met at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near
Dayton, Ohio, from November 1 to November 21, 1995. These
Bosnia Proximity Peace Talks were attended by the BH Republic,
represented by President Izetbegovic; the Republic of Croatia,

headed by President Tudjman; the FRY, represented by President
Milosevic of Serbia, who also represented Republika Srpska; the
BH Federation, led by President Kresimir Zubak; and the Contact

93.
Id.
94.
ICFY option (3) provided for three ethnically characterized "republics"
loosely confederated in a "union." See supraPart IIIA.
95.
As discussed, the BH Federation was actually based almost exclusively
on ICFY option (2). See supra Part II.A
96.
For a definition of Republika Srpska, see A Frameworkfor Bosnw Text
of anAccord by Three Governments, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1995, at A10.
97.
Szasz, supra note 33, at 373-74.
98.
Id.
99.
Id. at 374. Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic represented the RS.
Id.
100. Szasz, supra note 33, at 374. See Details of Accord Division Within
Unity, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1995, at A4 (reporting details of the accord); Elaine
Sciolino, Enemies in Bosnia Devise Stnwture for a Government, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept.
27, 1995, at A6 (describing the new governmental structure).
101. Szasz, supranote 33, at 374.
102. The Dayton Talks were primarily the work of the U.S. State
Department. Id. at 375.

1187

U.N. ELECTION-MONTORJNGMISSION

19971

Group.' 03 The main outcome of the Dayton Talks was the
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (hereinafter GFA).1 0 4 The GFA was an agreement
10 5
among the BH Republic, the Republic of Croatia, and the FRY.
The document contained eleven agreements annexed to the GFA.
(IA)
Agreement on Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement,
plus Status-of-Forces Agreements between the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (hereinafter NATO) and Bosnia and NATO and
10 6
Croatia, and a Transit Agreement between NATO and the FRY:
107
Agreement on Regional Stabilization;
(1B)
(2)
Agreement on Inter-Entity Boundary Line and Related
10 8
Issues;
10 9
Agreement on Elections;
(3)
0
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina; 11
(4)
(5)
(6)

11 1
Agreement on Arbitration;
112
Agreement on Human Rights;

(9)

Agreement for the Establishment

1 13
Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons
(7)
(8)
Agreement on Commission to Preserve National
1 14
Monuments;
1 15

of Bosnia

and

Herzegovina Public Corporations;
116
Agreement on Civilian Implementation;
(10)
1 17
Agreement on International Police Task Force.
(11)

The parties formally signed the GFA and the other agreements at
the Paris Peace Conference on December 14, 1995.118
Of particular importance to the nature of the "new" Bosnia is
Annex 2: Agreement on Inter-Entity Boundary Line and Related

103. I&at 374-375.
104. Id. at 375. For a text of the GFA, see Bosnia and Herzegovina - Croatia
- Yugoslavia: General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina
With Annexes, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 LL.M. 75 [hereinafter GFA].
105. Szasz, supra note 33, at 375.
106. GFA, supra note 104, annex I-A, at 91.
107. Id. annex 1-B, at 108.
108. Id. annex 2, at 111.
109. 1& annex 3, at 115.
110. Id. annex 4, at 117. The BH Constitution is not in the form of an
agreement; rather, it sets out the text of the constitution. Szasz, supranote 33, at

375 n.23.

It is supported by identically-worded declarations from the BH

Republic, the BH Federation, and the RS stating that they approve the
constitution. Id.
111. GFA, supranote 104, annex 5, at 129.
112. Id. annex 6, at 130.
113. Id- annex 7, at 136.
114. Id. annex 8, at 141.
115. Id. annex 9, at 144.
116. Id. annex 10, at 146.

117. Id.
annex 11, at 149.
118. Szasz, supra note 33, at 376.
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Issues. 1 1 9 This annex provides the map setting the boundaries
between the BH Federation and the RS. 120 The map is based on
the 51/49 split proposed earlier by the Contact Group; however, it
12 1
differs considerably in the details of specific land allocations.
Another provision of significant importance is Annex 4, the
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 12 2 It provides for the
formation of "Bosnia and Herzegovina" from the BH Republic and
recognizes as its "constituent peoples" "Bosniacs, Croats, and

Serbs... (along with others)." 123 Bosnia and Herzegovina was to
consist of the BH Federation and the RS. 1 2 4 The constitution
provides for three principal governmental bodies, a fifteenmember House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly, a threemember Presidency, and a six-member Constitutional Court. 125
The essential feature of these three bodies is that they contain an
equal number of Bosniac (Muslim), Serbian, and Croatian
members.126

IV. THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT FOR PEACE IN BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA

The relevant GFA provision for purposes of this discussion is
Annex 3: Agreement on Elections. 12 7 Annex 3 consists of six
Articles and an Attachment 128 Annex 3 purports to do more
than simply establish an election process; it ultimately seeks to
achieve a democratic government. 12 9 The Annex delegates the
election oversight authority to the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (hereinafter OSCE).130

119.
GFA, supranote 104, annex 2, at 111.
120. Paul C. Szasz. Introductory Note to Bosnia and Herzegovina - CroatiaYugoslavi: General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovlna
WithAnnexes, 35 I.L.M. 75, 79 (1996).
121.
Id.
122.
GFA, supranote 104, annex 4, at 117.
123.
Szasz, supranote 120, at 79.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.

127.
128.

GFA, supranote 104, annex 3, at 114-17.
Id. Article six merely contains signatures of representatives of the

Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and
the Republic of Srpska. Id. at 116.

129. Id. at 115 (stating parties agree "to promote free, fair, and democratic
elections and to lay the foundation for representative government and ensure the
progressive achievement of democratic goals throughout Bosnia and
Herzegovina).

130.

Id.

The OSCE originated from the Conference on Security and

Cooperation in Europe.

Organizatlonfor Security and Co-operation in Europe:
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A. Article I: Conditionsfor DemocraticElections
In Article I, the parties agree to ensure that proper conditions

are available for elections. 13 1 The parties place special emphasis

on a "politically neutral environment." t3 2 This article gives the
OSCE the power to certify whether proper election conditions
exist. 13 3 Article I concludes with an agreement to comply with
in the Attachment, for
specific comprehensive guidelines, listed
34
conditions.1
election
proper
ensuring
B. Article II: The OSCE Role
Article II specifically grants OSCE the power to establish and
oversee the elections program. 13 5 The OSCE is given broad
discretion to supervise the elections for the House of

Representatives of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Presidency of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the House of Representatives for the BH

Federation, the National Assembly of the RS, and the Presidency
of the RS.1 3 6 Furthermore, the OSCE may establish and supervise

elections for the cantonal legislatures and municipal governments
"if feasible." 13 7 To implement the elections program, the OSCE

Budapest Summit Declarationon Genuine Partnershipin a New Era, Dec. 6, 1994,
34 I.L.M. 764, 764 [hereinafter OSCE Budapest Summit]. The OSCE is a securityrelated entity with a membership "embracing States from Vancouver to
Vladivostock." Id. at 767. The OSCE plays a role in "early warning, conflict
prevention, and crisis management" in troubled regions. Id. at 768. "The [OSCE
is] a forum where concerns of participating States are discussed, their security
interests are heard and acted upon." Id. A focal point of the group is to "build a
genuine security partnership" in the regions of participating states. Id.
The OSCE is forthright about its democratic goals: "[Diemocratic values are
fundamental to our goal of a community of nations with no divisions, old or new,
in which sovereign equality and the independence of all States are fully respected,
there are no spheres of influence and the human rights and fundamental
freedoms of all individuals, regardless of race, colour, sex, language, religion,
social origin or of belonging to a minority, are vigorously protected." Id. The
OSCE recently played an active role in the Baltic conflicts. Id. at 776. The
emphasis on democratic goals and security helps validate the OSCE's role in the
Bosnian War. A comprehensive list of the objectives the OSCE adopted at the
Budapest Summit appears at 34 I.L.M. 773-776. Id. The OSCE's specific role in
the Bosnian elections is discussed in Article II of Annex 3. GFA, supra note 104,
annex 3, art. 11, at 115.
GFA, supranote 104, annex 3, art. II, at 115.
131.
Id.
132.
Id. annex 3, art. 1(2), at 115.
133.
134. Id. annex 3, art. 1(3), at 115.
135. Id. annex 3, art. 11(l), at 115.
136. Id. annex 3, art. 11(2), at 115.
137. Id.
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must establish a Provisional Election Commission. 138 Article 11(4)
creates a timetable for the elections.' 3 9 The elections must occur
within six months after the GFA enters into force, but no later
than nine months if the OSCE encounters a delay. 140
C. Article I:

The ProvisionalElection Commission

The
Provisional
Election
Commission
(hereinafter
Commission) is charged with implementation and oversight of the
elections.' 4 ' This occurs through rules regarding the registration
of political parties and candidates, eligibility of candidates and

voters, role of the election observers, open and fair campaigns,
and the publication and certification of election results. 14 2 The
responsibilities of the Commission include general oversight,

determination of voter registration procedures, compliance with
the election rules and appropriate remedies for violations, and
accreditation of international and domestic observers.' 43
The
Commission comprises the Head of the OSCE Mission or his or

her designee, representatives of the parties to the GFA, and
14 4
others the head of the OSCE may decide to include.

D. Article IV: Eligibility

Article IV establishes voter eligibility criteria and polling

requirements. 145 To be eligible to vote, a person must be eighteen
years old and appear on the 1991 census for Bosnia and
Herzegovina. 14 6 While this provision seems standard, the Article

also attempts to reverse one of the most serious effects of the
Bosnian War: ethnic cleansing. 14 7 Voters are generally required

to vote, in person or by absentee ballot, in the municipality where

138. Id. annex 3, art. 11(3), at 115. The duties of the Provisional Election
Commission are explained in Article IM. It. annex 3. art. I, at 115.
139. I. annex 3, art. 11(4), at 115.
140. I.
141. I. annex 3, art. E[1(1)(2), at 115-16.
142. Id. annex 3, art. 1I(l, at 115.
143. I. annex III. art. I(2), at 115-16.
144. Id. annex 3, art. 111(3), at 116. In addition, the Head of the OSCE is the
chairman of the Commission. Should any disputes arise, the decision of the
chairman is final. Finally, the Commission and the chairman are accorded
diplomatic privileges and immunities. Id. annex 3, art. Im(4). at 116.
145. Id. annex 3, art. IV, at 116.
146. Id. The Article does state that the Commission may provide eligibility
procedures for citizens not listed in the 1991 census. Id.
147. Szasz, supra note 120, at 79. "[Article IV] specifies that citizens are
generally to vote, in person or as absentees, in the place where counted in the
1991 census; thus, even if ethnic cleansing is not actually reversed, at least by
then, its effects on the political scene might be mitigated." Id.
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they lived in 1991.148 While a refugee may apply to vote in
another municipality, the "vote shall be interpreted as
confirmation of his or her intention to return to Bosnia and
Herzegovina." 14 9 Therefore, Article IV provides that, at least in
the initial elections, refugees and others who were displaced by
the war are given the opportunity to reverse ethnic cleansing
politically, even if unable or unwilling to do so physically.15 0
E. Article V: PermanentElection Commission
Article V provides that the parties wll create a Permanent

Election Commission to supervise future elections in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. I 5 l In Article I(3), the parties agreed to comply with
paragraphs seven and eight of the OSCE Copenhagen
Document.' 5 2 The Attachment contains certain provisions of the
Copenhagen Document.'15 3 This is one of the most important
parts of Annex 3 because it specifically lists certain actions the
parties will undertake to ensure the establishment of a
democratic form of government, including guaranteed open
elections, universal suffrage, the establishment and maintenance
of political parties and campaigns, open access to the press, and
the voluntary presence of interested foreign and domestic election
observers. 1

54

148.

GFA, supra note 104, annex 3. art. IV, at 116.

149.

Id.

150.
Paul C. Szasz, The Protecuon of Human Rights Through The
Dayton/ParisPeaceAgreement on Bosnia, 90 AM. J. INT'LL. 301, 312 (1996).
151.
GFA, supra note 104, annex 3, art. V, at 116.
152.
Id. annex 3, art. 1(3), at 115.

153.
154.

Id. annex 3. attachment at 117.
Id. Specifically, the Copenhagen Document declares:

(7) To ensure that the will of the people serves as the basis of the authority
of government, the participating States will
(7.1) hold free elections at reasonable intervals, as established by law;,
(7.2) permit all seats in at least one chamber of the national legislature to
be freely contested in a popular vote;
(7.3) guarantee universal and equal suffrage to adult citizens;
(7.4) ensure that votes are cast by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting
procedure, and that they are counted and reported honestly with the

official results made public;
(7.5) respect the right of citizens to seek political or public office,
individually or as representatives of political parties or organizations,
without discrimination;
(7.6) respect the right of individuals and groups to establish, in full
freedom, their own political parties or other political organizations and
provide such political parties and organizations with the necessary legal
guarantees to enable them to compete with each other on a basis of equal
treatment before the law and by the authorities;
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V. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF MULTNATIONAL ELECTION
MONITORING

As a general concept, the idea of election monitoring came
directly from the Peace of Versailles after World War One. 155
Former U.S. President Woodrow Wilson articulated the principle
of self-determination as a justification for election monitoring in
his famous Fourteen Points. 156
consequently began administering

The League of Nations
and observing elections to

15 7
enforce "the right of [people] to dispose of their own destiny."
Subsequently, self-determination became one of the purposes of

the U.N.1 5 8

Article 1(2) of the U.N. Charter states that one

purpose of the U.N. is "[tlo develop friendly relations among
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-

(7.7) ensure that law and public policy work to permit political
campaigning to be conducted in a free and fair atmosphere in which
neither administrative action, violence, nor intimidation bars the parties
and the candidates from freely presenting their views and qualifications, or
prevents the voters from learning and discussing them or from casting
their vote free of fear or retribution;
(7.8) provide that no legal or administrative obstacle stands in the way of
unimpeded access to the media on a non-discriminatory basis for all
political groupings and individuals wishing to participate in the electoral
process;
(7.9) ensure that candidates who obtain the necessary number of votes
required by law are duly installed in office and are permitted to remain in
that office until their term expires or is otherwise brought to an end in a
manner regulated by law in conformity with democratic parliamentary and
constitutional procedures[.]
(8) The participating States consider that the presence of observers, both
foreign and domestic, can enhance the electoral process for States in
which elections are taking place. They therefore invite observers from any
other . . . [OSCEI participating States and any appropriate private
institutions and organizations who may wish to do so to observe the
course of their national election proceedings, to the extent permitted by
law. They will also endeavor to facilitate similar access for election
proceedings held below the national level. Such observers will undertake
not to interfere in the electoral proceedings.
Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human
Dimension, June 29, 1990, paras. 7-8, 29 I.L.M. 1306, 1310 [hereinafter
Copenhagen Document].
155. Koff D. Asante, Election Monitoring's Impact on the Law: Can It Be
Reconciled With Sovereignty and Nontnterventn?,26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 235,
271 (1994).
156. Id.
157. ALFRED COBBAN, THE NATION STATE AND NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION 58
(1970). SeeAsante, supranote 155, at 272.

158. YVES BEIGBEDER, INTERNATIONAL MONrrORING OF PLEBISCITES, REFERENDA
AND NATIONAL ELEcTIONS: SELF-DETERmINAION AND TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 18
(1994).
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."159 Along with self-determination,

the existence of international human rights became embodied in
various international covenants.1 6 0 The many emerging human
rights treaties began to include in their provisions the right of
political participation,
the normative basis for election
monitoring. 16 1 For example, the 127 parties 16 2 who signed the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guaranteed in
Article 25 the right to "genuine periodic elections." 16 3 Numerous
other treaties and covenants contain similar provisions that

164
guarantee periodic elections.
This slow progress of the U.N. human rights agenda led the
organization to accept and promote democratic principles -as
universally-recognized
rights. 16 5
These human rights

instruments provided the impetus for the U.N. to offer assistance
in

the technical and legal aspects of democratic elections and

ultimately to organize

sovereign states. 166
people's right to

and monitor democratic

elections in

Election monitoring served to validate
participate in their state's political

development. 16 7 Therefore, as a legal matter, international law
68
authorized the election-monitoring concept.1

159.
U.N. CHAGrR art. 1, para. 2. Self-determination is also embodied in
Article 55 of the U.N. Charter. Asante, supranote 155, at 272.
160.
Asante, supra note 155, at 272. See Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948);
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, openedfor signatureDec. 16,
1966, S. ExEc. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23,
1976) [hereinafter Covenant on Civil and Political Rights]; International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976); Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, GA Res. 1514,
U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
161.
Gregory H. Fox. Multinational Election Monitoring: Advancing
InternationalLaw on the HighWire, 18 FORDi-AM IN 'L L. J. 1658, 1660 (1995).
162. As of July 1994, there were 127 parties to the agreement. Id.
163.
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 160, art. 25.
164. See e.g., European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (Protocol No. 1), Nov. 4, 1950, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 22;
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 23, 1144 U.N.T.S.

123, 9 I.L.M. 673 (entered into force July 18, 1978); African Charter on Human

and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, art. 13, O.AV. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev.5,
reprintedin 21 I.L.M. 59 (1982); International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, openedfor signatureMar. 7, 1966, art. 5(c), 660
U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966); Convention on the Political Rights of Women,
openedfor signatureMar. 31, 1953, art. 1, 27 U.S.T. 1909, 193 U.N.T.S. 135.
165. BEIGBEDER, supranote 158, at 91.
166. Id. at 91-92.
167. Asante, supra note 155, at 273.
168. Id.
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A. Acceptance of the Election-MonitoringConcept

Concerns about electoral issues have not traditionally been at
the human rights forefront for several reasons.
First,
modification of election and participatory rights by a foreign entity
16 9
have traditionally been considered highly intrusive to a state.
These rights have been viewed as local in nature, and states have
been free to reject the doctrine that political participation Is
prerequisite to legitimate governmental power. 170
With the

increased

recognition

of human

rights,

concerns

about

intrusiveness have been displaced by widespread acceptance of
the political participation doctrine.
A second reason is that modem democratic governments are
a recent development. 17 1 For example, universal suffrage was not
common in Western Europe until the mid-twentieth century, and
the United States did not eliminate poll taxes until 1964.172 If a
full participatory democracy did not prevail in two of the largest
"democratic" regions of the world, it would have been unrealistic
to expect it as an international norm. 173

Now, however, elected

governments are common in all regions of the world. 174
Finally, "international law has traditionally failed to
distinguish between regimes chosen by democratic procedures
and those chosen by other means." 175 Any group in effective
control was to be recognized as the state's legitimate
government. 176 This is at odds with the legitimacy principle of
17 7
democracy, the basis for the right to political participation.
Although the traditional rule may still exist today, the rise of
human rights norms has increased the international concern over
178
the quality of democratic governance.
B. Recent Developments ConcerningElection Monitoring
Nonetheless, the primary impetus for increased U.N. activity
in election monitoring was the end of the Cold War. 179 After
1989, the U.N. could focus on the precise meaning of "democracy"

169.
170.
171.

Fox, supranote 161, at 1662.
Id.
Id at 1663.

172.
173.

Id.
Id.

174.

Id.

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1662.
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a

[Fjree and periodic elections are the basis of any genuinely
democratic system and democracy Is an essential condition for the
achievement of the fundamental liberties for all to which Member
States have committed themselves ....
ITihe promotion of free
elections is closely tied to the support of the U.N. for the universal
realization of the right to self-determination, which is commonly
18 1
regarded as fundamental to the fulfillment of all human rights.

As election monitoring assists states in the transition to

democracy, the recent U.N. actions in establishing elections were
undertaken for the following reasons:
Democracies almost never fight each other.
Democratization
supports the cause of peace. Peace in turn is a prerequisite to
development. So democracy is essential if development is to be
sustained over time. And without development there could be no
democracy. Societies that lack basic well-being tend to fall into
18 2
conflict. So three great priorities are interlocked.
The institutional framework within the U.N. for monitoring
elections emerged in 1992 with the establishment of the Unit for
Electoral Assistance within the Secretariat. 18 3
The Unit was
subsequently upgraded to the Division of the Department of
Peacekeeping Affairs due to increased demand for electionmonitoring involvement. 184 In recent times, the U.N. participated
in the monitoring of elections in Namibia, Korea, Nicaragua, Haiti,
Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, and Liberia. 185 The operations

180. Id.
181. Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Principle of Periodic and Genuine
Elections: Report of the Secretary-General,U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item
98(b), at 5, U.N. Doc. A/46/609 (1991) [hereinafter Periodic and Genuine
Elections]. However, another view states that elections are only one part of a
democracy:
Elections in and of themselves do not constitute democracy. They are not
an end but a step, albeit an important and often essential one, on the path
towards the democratization of societies and the realization of the right to
take part in the governance of one's country as enunciated In major
human rights instruments. It would be unfortunate to confuse the end
with the means and to forget that democracy implies far more that the
mere act of periodically casting a vote, but covers the entire process of
participation by citizens in the political life of their country.
Id. at 24.
182. Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali, An Agenda For Peace: One Year Later, 37
ORBis 323, 329 (1993).
183. Fox, supranote 161, at 1661.
184. Id.
185. Id.; BEIGBEDER. supra note 158, at 98; David Stoelting, The Challenge
of UN-Monitored Elections in Independent Nations, 28 STAN. J. IN'L L. 371, 375
(1992).
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in Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, and Liberia were the result of
U.N.-negotiated peace agreements to end civil wars. 18 6
The
situation in Bosnia is similar. In Nicaragua, the monitoring
process was part of a five-state peace agreement that called for
free and fair elections. 18 7 In contrast, election monitoring in Haiti

was the result of an invitation from then-President Trouillot of
Haiti, which the U.N. General Assembly ultimately accepted. 188
Thus, the U.N. decision to monitor elections could be the result of
a negotiated peace plan or an invitation to monitor.
C. Goals andPurposesof Election Monitoring

Election monitoring serves two main purposes. The first and
broader purpose is to promote and maintain international peace
and security. 18 9 The second is to promote self-determination and
democracy in individual countries. 19 0 The latter purpose is
accomplished through aspiring:
19 1
1) to bear witness to the election process;
2) to discover and to reveal problems that might emerge in the
electoral process, ideally when there Is still time to do something
about the problems, thereby helping to solve them; 192

186. Fox, supranote 161, at 1661.
187. Asante, supranote 155, at 273.
188. Id. at 274.
189. Melida N. Hodgson, When to Accept When to Abstan A Frameworkfor
U.N. ElectionMonitoring, 25 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 137, 150 (1992).
190. See generally Sonia K. Han, Note, Building a Peace That Lasts: The
United Nations and Post-Civil War Peace-Building,26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 837
(1994). Han notes:
In every mission, the central task of the United Nations is to conduct or
supervise national elections, Including establishment of electoral laws,
voter and party registration, voter education, polling, investigation of
complaints, and verification of the elections. In all cases, there Is to be
universal suffrage in multi-party elections by secret ballot under a
politically neutral environment. The former warring factions are to be
transformed into political parties standing for elections. There is to be free
and equal access of the parties to the media, as well as freedom of speech,
assembly, and movement, and the absence of fraud and Intimidation.
Every adult citizen, including refugees and displaced persons, have the
same rights, freedoms, and opportunities to take part in the electoral
process.
Id. at 871.

191.

Michael Carowitz, Intemational Observationsof Elections, 84 AM. Soc'Y

INT'L L. PROC. 375, 376 (1990). This includes observation and, perhaps, written
reports, press conferences, meetings and newspaper articles to help provide a
free, electoral environment. Id. at 378-86.
192. I. at 376.
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3) to embolden those who might otherwise be intimidated about
19 3
participating in the political process:
4) to ensure that an independent, impartial, and objective report
evaluating the electoral process in a particular country is
19 4

prepared;
5) to encourage participation in the electoral process by
to report any significant manipulation of the electoral
undertaking
19 5
process;
196
6) to assist in ensuring the integrity of the electoral process;
and
7) to evaluate the general human rights situation of the
19 7
country.

The U.N. Secretary-General emphasizes the U.N.'s broader
purpose of promoting self-determination and democracy, rather
"Electoral verification goes
than merely election observation:
beyond the mere recording of the process . . . . A passive role is
untenable, all the more so in situations of extreme mistrust,
polarization, or violence."1 98 Therefore, the U.N. seeks more than
simple procedural improvements in the electoral process; it wants
to "increase confidence in the electoral process, which should, in
turn, result in increased voter participation and greater legitimacy
for the process itself."19 9 This comment illustrates the likely
focus of U.N. election-monitoring policy in the coming years.
D. OSCE and Election Monitoring
The OSCE, the organization in charge of monitoring the

Bosnian elections, only recently emphasized the importance of
Its member states
free elections in a democratic society. 20 0
declared that the basis of authority and the legitimacy of a state's
government is the "will of people, freely and fairly expressed
through periodic and genuine elections."20 1 This led states to
enhanced presence of election
encourage and recommend the
20 2
observers at national elections.
The OSCE established the Office of Free and Fair Elections in
Warsaw in 1991.203 Its original task was to facilitate contacts

193. Id.
194. LARRY GARBER, lNT'L HUM. Ras. L. GRoup, GUIDEINES FOR INTERNATIONAL
ELECInON OBSERVING 13 (1984).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. I.
198. Periodicand GenuineElections, supranote 181, at 20-21.
199. Id.
200. BEIGBEDER, supra note 158, at 256.

201.
202.
203.

Id. at 257. See generally Copenhagen Document, supra note 154.
BEiGBEDER, supranote 158, at 257.
Id. at 258.
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and an exchange of information on elections within OSCE

member states. 20 4 A year later, this office was renamed the Office
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (hereinafter
ODIHR).20 5
The name change alone reflected a new and
enhanced purpose. Instead of simply focusing on elections, the
ODIHR became an institutional framework for the sharing of
information on technical assistance and programs to assist newlydeveloped democracies in establishing permanent democratic
institutions. 20 6 The increased responsibilities were the result of
the OSCE's recognition that free and fair elections did not
guarantee a democracy. 20 7
The ODIHR organized election
seminars before elections and conducted full election-monitoring
missions in subsequent years. 20 8 These seminars and missions
took place in Bulgaria, Poland, Albania, Estonia, Romania,
20 9
Georgia, and Lithuania.
The OSCE has prior experience n the Yugoslav region. In
1992, the OSCE conducted a highly successful electionmonitoring operation in Slovenia.2 10 After declaring the elections
free, fair, and consistent with international standards, the OSCE
stated it did not anticipate the need to monitor further elections
21
in Slovenia. 1
The OSCE's missions in Serbia and Montenegro in 1992 did
not have similar success. An ODIHR advance team of observers
Initially postponed the elections after concluding that proper
conditions for free and fair elections did not exist.2 12 Despite a
recommendation for postponement for at least two months, the

204. I& Specifically, the Office was to compile information on the dates,
procedures, official results of national elections, and reports of election
observations.
On request, these were to be provided to governments,
parliaments, and interested private organizations. In addition, it was to facilitate

contact among governments, parliaments, or private organizations wishing to
observe elections and competent authorities of the states in which the elections
are to take place. Finally, the Office was to organize and serve as the venue for
seminars or other meetings related to election procedures and democratic
institutions at the request of the participating states. Id. at 258-59.

205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id In addition, the ODIHR's expanded role was the result of the
OSCE's increased membership after the break-up of the USSR and Yugoslavia.
Id.
208. Id. at 259-61.
209. Id. For the most part, these were successful missions. However,
consistent with the expanded role of the ODIHR, improvements in the local
procedures were suggested. Id.
210. IcLat261.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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elections took place without OSCE election observers. 2 13 The
OSCE noted significant problems with subsequent elections in
December 1992. The election, which re-elected Serbian President
2 14
Slobodan Milosevic, was also declared not to be free and fair.
The observers recognized the ruling party's abuse of power in
using the parliament, judiciary, and electoral administrations to
2 15
suppress opposition candidates.
Therefore, the OSCE entered the Bosnian elections with
experience in election monitoring in the Yugoslav region; however,
the violence and ethnic tensions surrounding Bosnia presented
the OSCE with a unique challenge to its election-monitoring
capabilities.

VI. Do THE U.N. AND THE OSCE/ODIHR

BELONG

IN BosNIA?

The enhanced role of the U.N. election-monitoring effort has
been criticized by those who view it as "social engineering" or
"nation building" and consider it an interference with
sovereignty. 2 16 Because many states subject to U.N. election
monitoring have little experience transferring power through
2 17
elections, the risk of failed missions is substantial.
can lead to
Furthermore, failed monitoring operations
of
'nation-building'
viability
"widespread cynicism about the
efforts." 2 18 Additionally, national discretion regarding sovereign

219
power within a state is the "essence of political autonomy."

Under the U.N. scheme, the choice of whether election monitoring

213. Id. The advance team recognized that the FRY did not function as a
multi-party system. The ruling party had exclusive control of the nationwide
electronic media. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 261-62. Such problems included the monopoly of the media,
multiple registration and voting. intimidation of voters, low standards of secrecy
at the polls, and group and military voting prior to election day. It/
216. Fox, supranote 161, at 1659.
217. Id. at 1659-60. It is possible that -the results of an extremely close
election may be rejected by claims of fraud; a coup may topple the elected
government; the incumbent government may refuse to yield power; the winning
party may begin to oppress its opponents; new guarantees of party pluralism may
institutionalize old ethnic rivalries; and the high expectations of instant social
reform that often accompany democratic transitions may not materialize." Id.
The threat of new political parties reviving ethnic conflicts is especially
substantial in Bosnia. The rotating presidency by the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats
virtually guarantees this occurrence.

218.

Id. at 1660.

219.

Id.at 1659.
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occurs rests with individuals and organizations whose only
220
relationship to the state is their presence during an election.
A. The U.N. Debate

The overarching principle regarding U.N. participation in
election monitoring is whether the U.N. Charter prohibits its
involvement in electoral matters despite the invitation or consent
of a member state. Article 2(7) of the Charter provides:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the U.N.
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require Members to submit such
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under
221
Chapter VII.

The debate focuses on the tension between two competing
principles: support for the free and fair elections as an expression
of an individual's participatory right of government, on the one
222
hand, and respect for state sovereignty on the other.
The opposition to U.N. election monitoring voices the
developing nations' concern that increased election monitoring
will result in renewed cultural and political imperialism.2 2 3 U.N.
Resolution 45/151, sponsored by these states, "affirmed that It
was the concern solely of peoples to determine methods and to
establish institutions regarding the electoral process."2 24 The
Resolution further stated that "any extraneous activities that

attempt, directly or indirectly, to interfere in the free development
of national electoral processes, in particular in developing
countries, or that intend to sway the results of such processes,
violate the spirit and letter of the principles established in the
2 25
Charter."

220.

Id.

221.

U.N. CHARIR art. 2, para. 7.

222.

Jon M. Ebersole, The United Nations' Response to Requests for

Assistance inElectoralMatters, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 91, 97 (1992).
223. Hodgson, supranote 189, at 146.
224. Respectfor the Principlesof NattonalSovereignty and Non-Interference in
the InternalAffairs of States in their Electoral Process, GA. Res. 151, U.N. GAOR
3d Comm., 45th Sess., pt. 1, 69th mtg., at 460, U.N. Doe. A/45/151 (1990),
reprinted in Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Questions, Including
Alternative Approachesfor Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and
FundamentalFreedoms, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Agenda Item 98(b), at 3, U.N.
Doc. A/46/616 (1991) [hereinafter Human Rights Questions].
225. Id. at 3. China emphasized that political, social, legal and electoral
systems are the internal affairs of a country. Consequently, "the United Nations
does not have the mandate and authority to intervene in the internal matters,
including electoral matters, of its Member States." Id. at 5. Mexico stated a
similar view by contending that elections are a subject within the sole competence
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Support for U.N. election monitoring rests on the principle
that "authority to govern shall be based on the will of the
people"22 6 and that "determining the will of the people requires an
electoral process."2 2 7 Japan, representing the industrialized
states' view on this issue, stated that it "regards such assistance
as essential in promoting and encouraging respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all."2 2 8
B. The OSCE View

Debate continues within the U.N. concerning the proper
application of election-monitoring policies. The OSCE has also
dealt with the sovereignty issue as it pertained to OSCE policies.
The most forceful declaration of the OSCE's view took place at the
Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of
the OSCE in 1991:
The participating States emphasize that the issues relating to
human rights, fundamental freedoms, and democracy and the
rule of law are of international concem, as respect for those rights
and freedoms constitutes one of the foundations of the
intemational order. They categorically and irrevocably declare
that the commitments undertaken in the field of the human
dimension of the [OSCE] are matters of direct and legitimate
concem to all participating States and do not belong exclusively
229
to the intemal affairs of the State concemed.

Thus, the OSCE did not view state sovereignty as an
impediment to the promotion of human rights and democratic
institutions.

of the citizens of each country and that each country must solve the problems
involved in a democratic government without outside interference. Id. at 9.
226. Ebersole, supranote 222, at 97 (citing Periodic and Genuine Elections,
supra note 190, I 1).
227. Id. (citing Periodic and GenuineElections, supra note 181, I 3).

228. Periodic and Genuine Elections, supra note 181, Addendum 1, at 24.
The EC echoed an even stronger view:.
Mhe Twelve [Nations of the EC] endorse the right and the moral obligation
of the international community to intervene for the protection and

promotion of all human rights. They stress the prime importance of the
right to vote and to be elected, at genuine periodic elections, for the full
affirmation of human dignity ....
...
mhe protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms should
not be construed by any person as interference in the internal affairs of a
State ....
The Twelve [Nations of the EC] attach great importance to the principle of free and
periodic elections as the expression of the right of peoples to self-determination
enshrined in the Charter. Id. at 25.
229.

BEIGBEDER, supranote 158, at 258.
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C. ChapterVII of the U.N. Charter
The debates within the U.N. regarding election monitoring
and Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter and its non-interventionist
policy apply only to intervention when the scope of the affair is
domestic.
Once the scope becomes international, the U.N.
Charter allows intervention. Article 2(7) states this exception to
non-intervention: "[This principle [of non-intervention] shall not
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter
VII." 2 3 0 Chapter VII, through Article 39, allows the U.N. Security
Council to take action to "maintain or restore international peace
and security" when it determines that "any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression" exists. 2 3 1 Therefore,
objections to election monitoring as a violation of non-intervention
and state sovereignty are overcome, because Article 2(7) does not
2 32
supersede actions by the Security Council under Chapter VII.
Enforcement actions taken pursuant to Chapter VII are thus
2 33
legal, and the use of force for such reasons is also legal.
In theory, this framework should be easily applied in different
situations. If the affair is domestic, intervention is prohibited; if
the affair is international, intervention is allowed. In practice,
however, what begins as a domestic affair may escalate and
involve surrounding states. 23 4 Such a conflict, while physically
within one state, will impact the rest of the world. 2 35 Therefore,
the question for the U.N. Security Council became whether the
conflict in Bosnia was domestic in nature or whether it posed a
threat to "international peace and security," permitting U.N.
intervention and election monitoring.
The election-monitoring efforts in Bosnia, specifically
authorized in the GFA, are legitimate Chapter VII actions. The
Bosnian conflict was properly classified as an international affair.
The U.N. Security Council stated that the "continuation of this
situation constitutes a threat to international peace and

230.

U.N. CHAR=ER art. 2, para. 7.

231. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. Article 39 states: "The Security Council shall
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be
taken... to maintain or restore international peace and security."
232.
233.

Hodgson, supranote 189, at 149.
Jon E. Fink, From Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement. The BluTing of

the Mandatefor the Use of Force in MaintainingInternationalPeace and Security, 19
MD. J. I~r'LL. &TRADE 1, 40 (1995).

234. Yoshiko Inoue, United Nations' Peace-KeepingRole in the Post-Cold War
Era; The Conflict in Bosnla-Herzegovina, 16 LOY. LA INT'L & COMP. L.J. 245, 248
(1993).

235.

Id.
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security."2 3 6 This determination was necessary to trigger Article
39 and Chapter VII authorization for intervention. Admittedly,
the conflict was originally domestic in nature and was a fight for
self-determination in a newly established state; 23 7 however, as the
conflict escalated, threats to international peace and security
In a series of resolutions, the Security Council
emerged.
articulated the precise threats. These included:
1) the transboundary effects of the refugee situation,

2) the inability to deliver humanitarian aid due to the civil war,
3) ethnic cleansing, and

2 38
4) other violations of international law.

These findings are based on the recognition that the refugee
problem and the internal "grave and systematic" human rights
violations warranted Chapter VII action. 23 9 Although using

human rights violations as the sole basis for Chapter VII actions
has not been formally recognized, it is emerging customary
40
law. 2
Because the human rights situation was such a significant
motivating factor behind the Chapter VII authorization, election
monitoring should be the first step toward a final solution. As
previously discussed, an individual's right to participate in
government is an essential human right. 24 1 This right is properly

exercised through periodic free and fair elections. Through these
elections, individuals empanel the popularly elected government.
This process results in the legitimization of the government.
Legitimization of the government is essential for a lasting
democracy.
A legitimate government will be less likely to commit human
rights violations because it must answer to the populace at the
elections. This, of course, assumes the elections are periodic,
free, and fair. This process will not totally prevent the human
rights problem, the most significant issue in the Bosnian conflict,
but it will make such problems less likely to occur.

236.

See U.N. SCOR, Res. 721, 3018th mtg., at 44 (1993).

237. Inoue, supranote 234, at 251.
238. Fink, supra note 233, at 41. See S.C. Res. 757, 47th Sess., 3082d
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/INF/48 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.N.Y.B. 352-54, U.N. Sales
No. E.93.1.1; S.C. Res. 770, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/INF/48 (1992),
reprinted in 1992 U.N.Y.B. 365-66; S.C. Res. 771, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/INF/48 (1992) reprinted in 1992 U.N.Y.B. at 366 (detailing the threats to
international peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and calling for an end to the
violence).

239.

Fink, supra note 233, at 41.

240.
241.

I& at 42.
See supraPart V.A.
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Enhanced
"nation-building"
U.N.
election-monitoring
missions help to produce legitimate governments. They help to
establish democratic institutions and norms that, if successful,
will result in long-lasting democratic government. Therefore, in a
situation like the Bosnian conflict where human rights violations
pose the most significant threat to international peace and
security, election monitoring is both lawful and appropriate.

VII. THE ELECTIONS iN BosNIA
As a result of Annex 3 of the GFA, elections in Bosnia were
held on September 14, 1996. At this time, Serbs, Croats, and
Muslims were to vote in the election for the presidency of Bosnia

and the presidency and parliament in the RS. Elections were also
scheduled for a federal parliament and a parliament in the BH
Federation. Of these elections, the most anticipated were the
Bosnian presidency and the RS presidency.
After a review of the total votes, the OSCE confirmed that
incumbent Muslim Alija Izetbegovic won the Bosnian federal
presidency and would serve as chairman of the new three-man
federal presidency. 2 4 2 Izetbegovic was followed by Serb candidate
Momclo Krajisnik and Croat candidate Kresimir Zubak. 24 3 The
244
three men will serve together in the three-man presidency.
Biljana Plavsic, a close associate of Krajisnik, won the presidential
245
election for the RS.
Although the elections produced quantified results, they were
marred by significant problems. 2 46 At the time of the elections,
serious problems remained regarding freedom of movement,
association, expression, and the establishment of a politically
neutral environment. 2 4 7 All of these are required by Article I of

242.

Izetbegovic, Plasvc Confirmed as Poll Winners, Deutsche Presse-

Agentur, Sept. 23, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, DPA File. He received
731,024 votes, about 34,000 more than the closest candidate. Id.
243. Bosnia's Muslim PresidentElected Chairman in Elections, Dow Jones
News Serv., Sept. 18, 1996, availablein WESTLAW, DJNSPLUS Database.
244. Id.
245. Bosnia Election/Certtfied-2:Izetbegovic May Have "Edge," Dow Jones
Intl News Serv., Sept. 29, 1996. availablein WESTLAW, DJINSPLUS Database.
246.

Colin Soloway, UN Cites Vote Fraud in Bosnia, Cm. TRIB., Sept. 26,

1996, at 13N. One Western diplomat stated, "It's hard to think of an
internationally supervised election which has been so obviously cooked .... And
never in the field of international diplomacy have so many people tried to cover it
up." IcL
247. After the election, the United States learned that Iran had secretly
delivered $500,000 to then-presidential candidate Izetbegovic. Steven L. Myers,
Iran Contributed $500,000 to Bosnian President'sElection Effort, U.S. Says, N.Y.

TIMES, Jan. 1, 1997, at A4. Izetbegovic admitted the payments, but denied the
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Annex 3,248 which specified the conditions that were to exist
before elections took place:
The Parties

shall ensure that conditions exist for the

organization of free and fair elections, in particular a politically
neutral environment; shall protect and enforce the right to vote in
secret without fear or intimidation; shall ensure freedom of
expression and of the press; shall allow and encourage freedom of
association (including political parties); and shall ensure freedom
24 9
of movement.
These conditions, however, did not exist and the voting
procedures contained multiple problems.
In addition, other
2 50
civilian portions of the GFA remained unenforced.
Voter turnout was one obvious problem. Prior to the election,
Robert Frowick, chairman of the OSCE mission, and Jeff Fischer,
OSCE general elections director, declared that the Bosnian
electorate consisted of 2.9 million people. 2 5 1 These figures had
been used in both public statements and internal planning
documents. 25 2 Voter turnout was estimated at sixty to seventy
percent. 25 3 Taking this into account, the International Crisis
Group, an independent monitoring organization, decreased the
electorate by a conservative number of 600,000 people who
certainly did not vote. 2 54 This resulted in a potential electorate of
approximately 2.34 million people. 2 5 5
The problem became
dramatically evident when it was revealed that 2.43 million votes
were cast,2 5 6 suggesting that voter turnout was an impossible
103.9%.257 This painted a picture of wide-scale voter fraud.

money had gone to his campaign. He stated the money had funded more than
one thousand scholarships. Muslim Leaders Deny Funds from Iran Used in
President'sCampaign, CHm. Twm., Jan. 5, 1997, at C6. Although the payment did
not expressly violate the GFA, it raised questions about a politically neutral
environment.
248. Anna Husarska, Bosnian Elections: The 103.9% Solution, WALL ST. J.
(Europe), Oct. 4, 1996, availablein 1996 WL-WSJE 10751891.
249. GFA, supranote 104. annex 3, art. I, at 115.
250. Patrick Moore, What Dayton Wrought, WALL ST. J. (Europe), Sept. 18,

1996, availablein 1996 WL-WSJE 10750851.
251. See Colin Soloway, Fairor Not, Results of Bosnia Elections Are Now
CertifiedMulti-Ethnic Government Given Go-Ahead, Cm. TRiB., Sept. 30, 1996, at 3
[hereinafter Soloway, FairorNot]; Husarska, supranote 248.
252.
Soloway, supranote 246.
253.
Bosnla-Herzegovlna Ethnic Leaders Win in Internationally Supervised
Election, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEws DIG., Sept. 19, 1996, at 673 available in

LEXIS, News Library, FACTS File.
254. Husarska, supra note 248.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. A separate U.N. analysis calculated a turnout close to 120%.
Soloway, FairorNot, supranote 251.
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The OSCE responded by disavowing its own public and
internal estimates of 2.9 million voters, stating that the electorate

was actually 3.2 million people. 2 58 However, the OSCE presented

no evidence to support the 3.2 million figure. 259

The OSCE

Election Appeals Sub-Commission called for a full ballot recount
after the Crisis Group filed a complaint. 260
The Provisional

Election Commission rejected a recount. 26 1 Frowick stated it was
"neither practical nor a necessary response to the concerns
262

reported."
In addition to voter turnout fraud, several irregularities in the
voting and monitoring procedures arose.
Jeff Fischer, OSCE
general elections director, stated the Bosnian elections were "the
most closely monitored elections in history."2 63 This broad claim
is not supported by the evidence. The OSCE admitted that thirty
percent of the 4600 polling stations were never visited by election
monitors. 2 64 Others were monitored for only a few hours at a
2 65
time.

Problems in voting procedures were also evident.

As

previously discussed, one important provision in Annex 3 of the

GFA allowed refugees to vote in

266
their original homeland.

However, despite expectations of 150,000 refugee voters, only
20,000 crossed the ethnic boundary from the BH Federation to
267
the RS, and only 4000 went from the RS to the BH Federation.
This resulted from a lack of safety measures for refugee

transportation. 2 68 Furthermore, refugees who attempted to vote

258. Soloway, supranote 246; Soloway, FairorNot, supranote 251.
259. Soloway, Fairor Not supranote 251. Christian Christensen, director
of voter registration for the OSCE, stated he knew of no statistical models
analyzing the population that support the 3.2 million figure. Soloway, supra note
246. He stated, "Frankly, I doubt there is any such model." Id.
260. Husarska, supranote 248.
261. Id; Soloway, Fair or Not supranote 251.
262. Husarska, supranote 248.
263. Soloway, supra note 246; Soloway, FairorNot supranote 251.
264. Soloway, supra note 246; Soloway, Fairor Not, supra note 251. 'The
ratio of international observer teams to polling stations (one to eight) and the
former's general unfamiliarity with the local language inspires only modest
confidence in the observer mission." Nigel Purvis, Observations on the Bosnian
Elections From PriJedor,Republika Srpska, 21 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., WinterSpring 1997, at 15, 23-24.
265. Soloway, FairorNot, supranote 251.
266. See GFA, supranote 104, annex 3, art. W, at 116.
267. Tracy Wilkinson, EVMonitors Say Bosnia Vote Was Not "Free,Fair,"LA
TIMES, Sept. 15, 1996, at Al [hereinafter Wilkinson, EVMonltors].
268. "A large part of the problem is they were simply afraid," stated Kris
Janowski, spokesman for the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.
Id. In one case, U.S. Army officers stopped two buses of refugees traveling to a
distant polling station because the refugees' safety could not be guaranteed. The
buses turned around, and the refugees did not vote. Id. International election
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were not guaranteed access to the polls. At one location,
international police admitted they had turned away private cars
269
carrying refugee voters on strict orders to deny passage to cars.
One of the main purposes of the international monitoring effort,
and the OSCE's responsibility under the GFA, was to facilitate the
return of refugees to their former villages. Therefore, the election
procedures effectively legitimized the boundaries achieved
through ethnic cleansing.

In addition, overt and subtle intimidation existed at many of
the polling stations. Depending on the location of the polling
station, certain ethnic groups were given favorable treatment
when problems arose. Voters' movements were constrained to
certain areas. Presumably, the threat of possible violence led to
the limited number of refugees who returned to their homelands
to vote. The refugees did not possess the same rights as nondisplaced persons, and freedom of movement was not a reality.
Surely a one-sixth voter turnout among the most obvious victims
of the civil war cannot constitute part of a free and fair election.
Furthermore, some polling stations were located in substandard areas. One, for example, was in a rock quarry, and
another was on the edge of a live minefield. 2 70 A third was
located next to a destroyed mosque and a fourth next to a former
271
torture site which contained traces of its past activities.
Moreover, ballot boxes at one location were inscribed in the
Cyrillic alphabet used by the Serbs while a Serbian flag briefly
flew outside. 27 2 In the city of Blatna in the RS, a war-tom
schoolhouse was used as a polling station where Muslim refugees
could vote.2 7 3 Bullet marks and blood stains scarred the school's
walls.

2 74

Other election violations included stoning and turning back
some refugee buses and attacking an election official with hand

organizers, In some instances, prevented Muslim refugees from voting in their
homeland and shuttled them to polling stations away from their villages. Tracy
Wilkinson, Bosnia Elections Reaffrm Massive Ethnic Divisions, LA. TIMES, Sept.
15, 1996, at Al [hereinafter Wilkinson, BosnianElections].

269.

Purvis, supra note 264, at 25.

270.
271.

Wilkinson. EVMonltors, supra note 267.
OSCE Confirms Bosnian Election Results After Review of Complaints,

Deutsche Presse-Agentur. Sept. 29, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, DPA
File.
272.
273.

Wilkinson, BosnianElections, supranote 268.
Purvis, supranote 264, at 22.

274. Id. "Inside the school, more bullet marks scar the walls. Faded, but
unmistakable, blood stains one wall. Burnt crimson hand prints, shoulder width
apart, streak dramatically toward the floor from about chest height." Id.
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grenades in a Muslim town. In addition, Serbs refused to open a
polling station near the Muslim enclave of Gorazde. 2 75
The most significant technical problem was that voters could
not locate their names on the voter lists. 2 76 At certain locations,
an estimated five to ten percent of long-time residents were not on
the final OSCE voter lists. 2 7 7 Local Election Committee members
and political party election observers were also missing from some
lists, 2 78 creating waits of up to ten hours for some voters. 2 7 9
These delays created problems, especially for Muslim refugees in

the RS. Whereas Serbs unable to locate their names on voter lists
could consult a master list in Election Committee offices, Muslim
refugees had no such recourse because their movement was
2 80
restricted by the Bosnian Serb and NATO police.
Problems with voter lists and other procedures increased the
likelihood of fraud. At one location, people who did not appear on
voter lists came back from the Election Committee offices with
forms printed in Bosnian stating that they could vote. 2 8 1 A
confused observer telephoned his headquarters, which told him to
honor the forms; however, the observer was notified two hours
later that the same forms were invalid. 2 8 2 In addition, certain
Serbs from Yugoslavia and refugees of Croatia were allowed to
vote illicitly on behalf of other refugees, displaced citizens, the
missing, and the infilm. 2 83 Such persons needed only "two
reputable individuals" to confirm their identity. 2 8 4 The possibility
of fraud increased because the OSCE allowed RS authorities to
appoint their members to all the positions on the election
commissions and polling station committees in the RS. 2 8 5
The procedure for transporting and processing the actual
ballots also became problematic. The ballots were supposed to be
transferred into tamper-proof plastic bags in the presence of an

275.
276.

Id.
See Id at 23; Wilkinson, EVMonltors, supranote 267.

277. Purvls, supra note 264, at 23. These rural residents could not vote
without a special form obtained in a nearby city to which travel was
impracticable. Thus, most of them ultimately unable to vote. Id.
278. Michael Miller, Ballots Not Bullets: One Attorney's Experience as an
Election Supervisorin Bosnia, 69 N.Y. ST. B.J. 8, 11 (1997).

279.

Wilkinson, EVMonltors, supranote 267.

280.

Id.

281.

Miller, supranote 278, at 11.

282.

Id.

283.

Purvis, supranote 264, at 23.

284. Id. All voters had their right index finger marked with Ink detectable
under a black light. However, only one polling station worker checked the ink,
and one worker checked identification papers. Dishonesty by either worker could
result in double voting or voting under a false identity. Id.
285. Id.
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election observer. 2 86 However, many local station workers did not
wait for election observers and transferred the ballots without
supervision. 2 8 7 Counting centers experienced similar problems.
The OSCE had not devised a system to process the ballots from
the polling stations and failed to instruct the international
election observers how to assist in such a task.2 8 8 The counting

of ballots in Tuzla was out of control because the lack of security
allowed intoxicated Bosnian election workers to angrily shout and
threaten abandonment of their unprocessed ballot bags while an
understaffed observer team worked furiously to properly account
for the ballots.2 8 9 When the counting finally ended at Tuzla, no
authorized OSCE official was present to properly certify the
results; the certification was conducted by a lower-level
29 0
international observer.
Despite these reported gross and widespread election
violations, the OSCE certified the election results on September
29, 1996.291 Frowick declared that the election "was a reasonably
democratic process and produced a reasonably
democratic
2 92
result," but he never declared it "free and fair."
The decision to certify the results may have been made for
political reasons. Some international officials believe the OSCE
was reluctant to scrutinize voter fraud allegations for fear that the
annulment of some results would cost Izetbegovic the
chairmanship of the presidency. In such a case, Kajisnik would
assume the chairmanship, a situation some American and
European policymakers described as a "nightmare."2 93 Another
explanation is based on U.S. President Bill Clinton's intense
desire to install the new members of government to present a
picture of a united Bosnia so as not to delay the homecoming of
American troops in an election year.2 94 Finally, a determination

286.
287.

Miller, supra note 278, at 11.
Id.

288.

Id. at 12. One international election observer, Fred Cowan, the former

Attorney General of Kentucky, was attempting to record incoming ballots while
tired and half-drunk Bosnians yelled at him to hurry and process their ballot
bags so they could leave. The situation was so raucous, Cowan was quoted as

stating, -There's going to be a riot if we don't get this thing under control." Id.
289. Id. The situation was not fully under control until American troops

arrived with ballots from the absentee polling stations. Id.
290. Id.
291.

OSCE Confirms Bosnian Election Results After Review of Complaints,

supra note 271.
292.
293.

Husarska, supra note 248.
Soloway, FairorNot supranote 251.

294. One Western official noted the Clinton Administration's "desperation to
sweep Bosnia's elections under the rug and get on with the peace process."
Recount Rejected in Bosnia Election Despite the Discovery of Irregularities;Peace
Plan Takes Priority as Nation Seeks Fresh Start, STAR TRiB., Sept. 28, 1996, at 7A,
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that free and fair elections had been conducted allowed the U.N.
Security Council to lift economic sanctions originally Imposed
against Yugoslavia in 1992.295

VIII. ELECTION ANALYSIS

The main purpose of the Bosnian elections under Annex 3 of
the GFA was "to promote free, fair, and democratic elections and
to lay the foundation for representative government and ensure
"296
the progressive achievement of democratic goals . ...
Therefore, an analysis of the elections must address this purpose
and determine whether it was satisfied. At the same time, it Is
necessary to understand that one-time free and fair elections 29do7
not simply transform a country into a stable democracy.

"Countries in transition to democracy must be given time to
evolve progressively towards people's participation in political
govemance, for democratic values to grow roots among the
leaders and the people." 298 Nevertheless, "elections are the
building block of all democratization:
no elections, no
democracy."299 However, the failure of the initial300elections may
slow down rather than accelerate democratization.
Furthermore, the legitimacy of a state like Bosnia rests in the
free participation of people in the creation and maintenance of the
state's government. 30 1 The OSCE recognized this when it
declared that "the will of the people, freely and fairly expressed
through periodic and genuine elections, is the basis of the
authority and legitimacy of all government."3 02 Thus, the
legitimacy of the Bosnian government is based on the validity of
the elections. This in turn is derivative of the success or failure of

available in 1996 WL 6930398

[hereinafter

Recount Rejected].

Other

commentator, contended that Clinton's political calendar and the upcoming U.S.
presidential elections were a contributing factor. Stephen S. Rosenfeld, Editorial,
Sticking to the DaytonAccords, WASH. PosT, June 14, 1996, at A25; Holger Jensen,
Editorial, Bosnia's Dead Cast Their Vote for Partitionof the Nation, SACRAMENTO
BEE, Sept. 18, 1996, at B7, availablein 1996 WL 3316891.
295. Recount Rejected, supra note 294. U.N. Security Council Resolution

1022 states that the economic sanctions would be lifted only after the first free
and fair elections. United Nations: Security Council Resolution 1022 Discussing the
Suspending of Various Security Council Resolutions After Implementing the Bosnian
PeaceAgreement, Nov. 22, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 259 (1996).
296. GFA, supranote 104, annex 3, art. I, at 115.
297. BEIGBEDER, supranote 158, at 297.
298.
Id.
299. Id. at 299.
300.
Id. at 298.

301.
302.

Asante, supranote 155, at 283.
Copenhagen Document, supra note 154, at 1309.
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the U.N. election-monitoring effort. Therefore, as a prerequisite
for a legitimate government, the critical requirement for the
success of the U.N. election-monitoring mission is "above all, the
essential moral and intellectual courage to formulate and
publicize their assessments that an electoral process has been (or
not) 'free and fair': after all is said, this last point is what
international election observation is 3all about, within the
30
framework of democratic development."
The elections in Bosnia have, in effect, slowed the
democratization process because the U.N. and the OSCE lacked
the "essential moral and intellectual courage" to declare that the
September 14, 1996, elections were not free and fair. Evidence of
substantial voter fraud and voting irregularities has undermined
the credibility of the elections, and consequently the legitimacy of
the Bosnian government.
The progress report of the NATO secretary-general describing
the result of U.N. involvement in the elections is an example of
this lack of courage. Amid evidence of fraud and violations of
Article I of Annex 3, the report stated:
The elections mark the initiation of a new phase in the effort to
restore stability and normal conditions to Bosnia and Herzegovina

through the establishment

of governing institutions on a

democratic basis. The political leadership now has the opportunity

to ensure that, in particular through the functioning of common
institutions at the national level, all three communities can work
towards the consolidation of a sovereign and united Bosnia and
Herzegovina based on the rule of law, respect for the human rights
of all peoples
30 4
democracy.

and

the

development

of

a

representative

Remarkably, this assessment was given while the report
305
acknowledged such clear violations of the electoral process.
The above action does not comport with the statement in Article I
that the parties "shall allow and encourage freedom of association
(including of political parties)."30 6 How does a country establish
"governing institutions on a democratic basis" while political

303. BEIGBEDER, supranote 158, at 300.
304. NATO: Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 1035 (1995), M2 Presswire, Oct. 8, 1996,
37, available in 1996 WL
13546875.

305. The electoral campaign was marked by certain abuses of the law
enforcement structures by the three ruling parties. In Serb and Croat areas,
Bosniacs who tried to campaign were prevented from doing so, opposition parties
were harassed, sometimes violently, and their supporters openly intimidated by
local authorities and by the cadres of the ruling parties. In Bosniac areas
harassment of political opponents by supporters of the ruling Bosniac party, the
Party of Democratic Action, was reported on various occasions.
Id.

7.
306.

GFA. supra note 104, annex 3, art. I, at 115.
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opponents are "openly intimidated by local authorities and the
cadres of the ruling parties?" It is surely not a reasonable
expectation. This open recognition by a powerful international
organization such as NATO should have caused the leaders of the
U.N. and the OSCE to decline to certify the elections as free and
fair because of violations of Article I of Annex 3. LIke NATO, the
United States seemed to ignore the electoral violations. President
30 7
Clinton declared the elections a "remarkable step forward."
Despite these proclamations of success, the violations of Article I
illustrate that the elections should not have been certified as free
and fair.
The election violations were too substantial and
30 8
widespread.
The apparent voter turnout figure of 103.9% clearly shows
voter fraud. While this figure was being formed, many individuals
could not locate their names on voter lists and did not vote.
Consequently, it appears that multiple registration and voting
occurred. All of these examples contravene Article I of Annex 3 of
30 9
the GFA and the essence of free and fair elections.
As previously mentioned, a significant purpose of free and
fair elections is to build confidence in the democratic process,
providing a basis for subsequent democratic institutions.3 10 The

U.N. acknowledged

that free and fair elections

"increase

confidence in the electoral process, which should, in turn, result
in increased voter participation and greater legitimacy for the
process itself."3 1 1 The spokesman of the senior international
envoy in Bosnia recognized this when he said, "There's been a war
here and the best way to build trust is for the elections not only to
3 12
be fair but to be seen to be fair by the former warring parties."
This confidence and trust in the process is essential for the
legitimacy of any Bosnian democratic government.
Is it possible that the elections, and the conditions under
which they took place, had the effect of increasing confidence in
the electoral and democratic processes? Does the international
community's recognition of violations of the GFA, and the
subsequent certification of the elections as nonetheless free and
fair, give the Bosnian people assurance of the democratic rule of
law and treaties? Do the voters who were unable to vote because

307. Moore, supranote 250.
308. See supraPart VII.
309. See Han, supra note 190, at 871 (discussing what rights and
procedures must be upheld for elections to be considered free and fair).
310. Periodic and Genuine Elections, supra note 181, at 20-21; Han, supra
note 190, at 871 n.179.

311. Periodicand GenuineElections, supranote 181, at 20-21.
312. Chris Stephen, OSCE's Biggest HeadacheRemains Bosnia Vote, Agence
Fr.-Presse, Dec. 1. 1996, available in 1996 WL 12191906.
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they were wrongfully omitted from eligible voter lists have
confidence in the democratic process and the right to vote? Do
members of opposition parties who were unable to campaign
possess confidence in the democratic process and the freedom of
expression and association? Do the refugees who were too
intimidated to return to their homelands and vote have confidence
in any type of democratic institution in Bosnia?
It appears that doubt and insecurity, rather than confidence,
exist in the minds of the Bosnian people after these elections.
This doubt calls into question the legitimacy of the Bosnian
government empaneled through these elections. The theory
employed by the U.N. and the OSCE that it is better to have a
government come to power through flawed elections rather than
to wait until conditions are proper for free and fair elections will
likely have adverse consequences in Bosnia.
The precise
consequences remain to be seen.
Perhaps the OSCE has learned a lesson. It appears to be

taking much more caution in the municipal elections, also
mandated by the GFA. These elections were initially scheduled to
coincide with the national elections in September 1996. 3 13
However, accusations that parties were packing voter lists in
certain towns, along with few improvements in freedom of
movement and the press, forced the OSCE to postpone the
elections three times. 31 4
At the time of this Note, the
31
elections were scheduled for September 13 and 14, 1997. 5
Whether waiting for the proper election conditions results in voter
confidence and trust in the overall democratic process remains to
be seen.
An imperfect process may improve over time. 31 6 However,
given the intense hatred and violence involved in the Bosnian
conflict, a solid, legitimate basis for democracy was needed. The
September 14, 1996, elections provided the ideal opportunity to
establish that basis for future democratic institutions.
Unfortunately, as a result of an unsuccessful U.N. and OSCE
election-monitoring mission, that firm foundation rests on shaky
ground.

313. Urgent Bosnian Local Elections Postponed Again, Agence Fr.-Presse,
Mar. 6, 1997, availabLe in LEXIS, News Library, AFP File.
314. Bosnian Municipal ElectionsPostponed to September. AP Pol. Serv., Mar.
6, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 2506299.

315.

Id.

316.

BEIGBEDER, supranote 158, at 297.
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IX CONCLUSION
In 1996, Bosnia was ripe for a successful election-monitoring
mission to instill in the Bosnian people confidence in the
democratic process. After Dayton, the parties seemed at least
outwardly ready to establish the foundations for democracy. The
U.N.'s and the OSCE's evolving election-monitoring policies and
capabilities appeared to be sufficient to assure free and fair
elections in Bosnia. However, the intense hatred between the
parties and the irreparable damage from the bloody civil war
presented a unique challenge to these capabilities. Nonetheless,
it was not an impossible task.
Unfortunately, because of international political pressure,

internal abuses by the parties and a lack of resources, the
elections were held under improper conditions. The GFA specified
that elections were to be held only under proper conditions.
While primarily the parties' responsibility to create proper
conditions, it was ultimately the U.N.'s and the OSCE's
responsibility to have the "essential moral and intellectual
courage" to declare that the elections were not free and fair under
the conditions, or to postpone the elections until such proper
conditions existed. Regrettably, this courage was lacking.
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